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Produce or Speculate? 
Asset Bubbles, Occupational Choice and Efficiency 
 
We study the macroeconomic effects of rational asset bubbles in an overlapping-generations 
economy where asset trading requires specialized intermediaries and where agents freely 
choose between working in the production or in the financial sector. Frictions in the market 
for deposits create rents in the financial sector that affect workers’ choice of occupation. 
When rents are large, the private gains associated with trading asset bubbles may lead too 
many workers to become speculators, thereby causing rational bubbles to lose their 
efficiency properties. Moreover, if speculation can be carried out by skilled labor only, then 
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 One of the changes that I would like to see ￿ and I￿ m going to be talking about in this in
weeks to come ￿ is seeing our best and our brightest commit themselves to making things ￿
engineers, scientists, innovators. For so long, we have placed at the top of our pinnacle folks who
can manipulate numbers and engage in complex ￿nancial calculations. And ￿ and that￿ s good. We
need some of that. But you know what we can really use is some more scientists and some more
engineers who are building and making things that we can export to other countries.
President Barack Obama, Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April 14, 2009
Introduction
The concern that the ￿nancial sector would have been overgrown in recent years, expressed in
President Obama￿ s speech, also re￿ ects the view of many professional economists, ￿nancial colum-
nists and business leaders.1 The prospect of large payo⁄s from trading complex ￿nancial products,
the story goes, would ultimately have resulted in a diversion of valuable human resources, notably
skilled labor, into ￿nancial activities and away from other (and perhaps more e¢ cient) productive
and innovative ones. While mostly based on anecdotal evidence, this common assessment of the
recent ￿nancial history has received some empirical support. For example, Philippon and Reshef
(2008) have shown that the U.S. ￿nancial sector has attracted much skilled labor in the 1990s and
the 2000s, thanks to large income premia relative to the wages paid in other industries. These
￿ndings are consistent with those of Goldin and Katz (2008), who document the spectacular as-
cendancy of ￿nance amongst (male) Harvard graduates over the same period.2 Overall, this trend
was associated with a pronounced upward movement in the relative size of the ￿nancial sector in
terms of both GDP and compensation shares ￿ see Philippon (2008), Philippon and Reshef (2008),
as well as Figure 1 for a summary of this trend.
This time period coincided with one of exceptionally high asset valuations, ￿rst in stock markets
in the 1990s, and then in real estate and related structured products in the 2000s. Whilst the issue
is probably not completely settled yet, a growing consensus has emerged to argue that the high
￿DotCom￿ and other stock prices of the 1990s were due to an asset bubble.3 And since the
worldwide ￿nancial crash of 2007-2008, it is hard to ￿nd a contrarian opinion to the view that
1See, for example, Du￿ o (2008), Krugman (2009), and Tett (2009), amongst many others.
2More speci￿cally, they document that amongst those who graduated in the early 1970s, about 5% of them ended
up holding a job in the ￿nance industry by the mid-1980s. In constrast, for those who graduated in the early 1990s,
15% held similar positions in the mid-2000s.
3See Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Nagel and Brunnermeier (2004) for the evidence, Shiller (2000) for a
behavioral perspective, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) for a contrarian view, and Caballero et al. (2005) for a (rational
expectations) model of ￿speculative growth￿with or without asset bubbles applied to the 1990s.




































































240 S&P500 (left scale)
Case-Shiller Home Price Index (right scale)


























































GDP share of finance and insurance
Compensation share of finance and insurance
Figure 1: Size of ￿nancial sector (Bureau of Economic Analysis, industry accounts) and asset prices
(Shiller￿ s dataset) in the U.S.
there was a major asset bubble (perhaps the largest in U.S. ￿nancial history) in housing prices and
related ￿nancial instruments before the crash.4 At the time we write, the impact of the crash on
the future of the ￿nancial sector, and notably on its size, remains uncertain.
The present paper takes the view that these two phenomena ￿ the large and growing size of the
￿nancial sector on the one hand, the presence of bubbles in asset markets on the other￿are related.
We make our point by constructing a consistent general-equilibrium framework in which the inter-
actions between asset bubbles, the size of the ￿nancial sector and aggregate e¢ ciency can be studied
and disentangled. The starting point of our analysis is a fairly standard overlapping-generations
(OLG) model wherein assets can be subject to intergenerational trade at prices higher than their
fundamental values, as in Samuelson (1958), Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987). The distinguishing
feature of our model is our assumption that ￿rm ￿nancing and asset trading require specialized
intermediation services. More speci￿cally, our economy has a production as well as a ￿nancial
sector, and new entrants choose where they wish to work based on the expected payo⁄s associ-
ated with either career. Producers earn the usual wage income, while ￿nanciers gather producers￿
saving, invest them in the menu of available assets, and make a living out of the intermediation
margin that they are able to collect. Crucially, we assume that market frictions limit the ability
of producers to meet alternative ￿nanciers and hence induce rents in the ￿nancial sector. These
rents in turn a⁄ect the relative payo⁄s associated with ￿nancial careers and hence the equilibrium
4See Blanchard (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), and Greenlaw et al. (2008) for complementary perspectives on the
asset-price boom and crisis of the 2000s.
3allocation of labor across sectors.5 This simple structure delivers the following main results.
First, asset bubbles unambiguously lead to an increase in the size of the ￿nancial sector. On the
one hand, bubbles raise the returns on traded assets ￿ they generate capital gains on trading bubbles
and, by no-arbitrage, also raise the return on other assets like claims to the capital stock. On the
other hand, rent extraction by the ￿nancial sector implies that speculators pass on to depositors
only part of these extra returns, causing the intermediation margin to rise. These greater payo⁄s
make working in ￿nance more attractive and translate into a larger equilibrium size of the ￿nancial
sector.
Second, the welfare impact of asset bubbles crucially depends on the extent of rent extraction
by the ￿nancial sector. When ￿nanciers have limited market power, they must pass on to deposi-
tors much of the extra returns associated with the bubbly equilibrium (relative to the bubbleless
equilibrium), enjoy small rents, so that the distortion in the intersectoral allocation of labor re-
mains itself limited. With su¢ ciently small rents, the bene￿cial impact of capital crowding out by
the bubble is found to remain dominant and the bubbly equilibrium is dynamically e¢ cient (as in
Tirole, 1985). On the contrary, large rents induce large in￿ ows of labor into the ￿nancial sector in
the bubbly equilibrium and substantial distortions in the allocation of labor across sectors. When
this crowding out of productive labor by the ￿nancial sector is su¢ ciently severe, asset bubbles
lose their e¢ ciency-improving properties and generate potentially large welfare losses for many
generations. To summarize, we ￿nd that the competing roles of capital crowding out and labor
crowding out are key in determining the ultimate impact of bubbles on aggregate welfare, both in
the steady state and along the transitional dynamics.
Third, asset bubbles raise income and consumption inequalities. We introduce intra-cohort
heterogeneity by dividing the working population into ￿skilled￿and ￿unskilled￿workers. Following
Philippon and Reshef￿ s observation that working in a world of highly deregulated and innovative
￿nance requires skills, we assume that the productive sector makes use of both labor types while
asset trading can be carried out by skilled labor only. In this context, asset bubbles attract skilled
labor into the ￿nancial sector and reduce the relative supply of skills in the productive sector. This
increases the marginal product of skilled labor while reducing that of unskilled labor, and hence
raises the equilibrium wage gap between the two labor types. In particular, we provides plausible
examples in which asset bubbles are bene￿cial to skilled, high-income workers (wherever they work),
whilst at the same time being detrimental to unskilled, low-income ones. The relationship between
bubbles and income inequalities that is predicted by our model appears consistent with the observed
5Our consideration of ￿nancial sector rents is motivated Philippon and Reshef￿ s (2008) observation that rents
accounted for 30 percent to 50 percent of the wage di⁄erential between the ￿nancial sector and the rest of the private
sector in the beginning of the 2000s. While our model has free entry and hence equalization of payo⁄s in equilibrium,
this is the outcome of a process whereby the determinant of rents crucially a⁄ect the ultimate size of each sector.
4rise in such inequalities in the U.S. during the 1990s and the 2000s (see Autor et al., 2006, Saez,
2009, and Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2009).
Our paper is related to at least four strands of research.
First, there is a large (and still growing) literature on the existence, dynamics and e¢ ciency
properties of bubbly equilibria (see, for example, Ventura, 2003; Caballero et al., 2006; and Fahri
and Tirole, 2009, for recent contributions on this topic). But to the best of our knowledge none
of the existing work speci￿cally pertains to the relationship between bubbles and the size of the
￿nancial sector. As is well known, in the baseline OLG model of Diamond (1965), where the only
friction lies in the demographic structure that prevents agents from participating in all markets,
asset bubbles improve welfare (relative to the bubbleless equilibrium) by providing agents with
the additional store of values necessary to transfer wealth across periods (see Tirole, 1985, and
Weil, 1987, 1989). Asset bubbles can be ine¢ cient, though, when other market imperfections
such as capital externalities are added to the OLG structure. For example, Saint-Paul (1992) and
Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) show that the crowding out of the capital stock by the bubble
loses its e¢ ciency properties under endogenous growth as it lowers growth and the welfare of
future generations. Relatedly, Olivier (2000) constructs a model in which households optimally
allocate their time endowment between production and research; in this context, bubbles on ￿rms￿
share favor ￿rm creation and may raise long-run growth. Our paper di⁄ers from these three latter
studies by ignoring external e⁄ects, and is thus closer to the basic (exogenous growth) framework
of Diamond, Tirole and Weil. In contrast to Olivier, we focus on the allocation of labor between
production and ￿nancial intermediation, thereby uncovering a novel source of ine¢ ciency associated
with bubbly equilibria.
Second, our paper is related to the contributions of Philippon (2007, 2008), who studies the
equilibrium size of the ￿nancial sector in a model with endogenous occupational choice in which ￿-
nanciers provide monitoring services to borrowing-constrained entrepreneurs. His framework makes
it possible to shed light on a number of interesting issues pertaining to the size of this sector, notably
regarding the sources of its historical variations and the desirability of corrective taxes when the
decentralized allocation of human capital across sectors is ine¢ cient. However, the impact of asset
bubbles on the allocation of labor across sectors has not yet been explored within this framework.
Third, some authors have emphasized the potentially ine¢ cient allocation of talents that may
follow from the presence of rents. For example, Baumol (1990) draws on historical evidence to
argue that the allocation of entrepreneurial resources in society primarily re￿ ects the distribution
of individual, rather than economywide, payo⁄s and may thus be socially ine¢ cient. In a related
contribution, Murphy et al. (1991) construct a model of occupational choice and show how private
returns may draw the marginal talent into rent-seeking, with the consequence of slowing down
5economic growth. While these authors explicitly refer to ￿trading￿and ￿speculation￿as prominent
rent-seeking activities, they do not speci￿cally study the role of bubbles in attracting talents into
the ￿nancial sector and the potential drain that may result for other (productive) sectors.
Fourth, there is large literature that sheds light on the interactions between ￿nancial market
imperfections and macroeconomic activity (see Tirole, 2005, for a survey). Within this strand of
research the papers that are most related to our approach are those of Wasmer and Weil (2004),
who introduce search frictions in both labor and credit market, as well as Femminis (2002) and
Sen (2002), who analyze the e⁄ects of rational bubbles when product markets are imperfectly
competitive. But none of these papers studies the interactions between asset bubbles, frictions in
the market for deposits, and the intersectoral allocation of labor.
Our paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 1. Sections 2 and
3 derive the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria of interest, and show that the bubbly
equilibrium has a larger ￿nancial sector than the bubbleless equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the
e¢ ciency properties of the bubbly equilibrium, and shows that they crucially depend on the size
of ￿nancial sector rents. Section 5 introduces intra-cohort heterogeneity to study the relationship
between asset bubbles and income inequalities. Section 6 provides some concluding comments.
1 The model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of two period-lived, risk-neutral agents who
maximize end-of-life consumption. Nt agents are born at date t, and the population grows at rate
n ￿ 0. Every agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young. A newly born agent chooses
between working in the production sector or entering the ￿nancial sector, and we denote by Lt the
number of ￿workers￿in the population at date t (so that Nt ￿ Lt is the number of ￿￿nanciers￿
in the population). The central di⁄erence between workers and ￿nanciers is in the technologies
that they have access to. There are two goods: labor, and a numeraire good, which is produced,
invested and consumed.
1.1 Technologies
The numeraire good is produced with a constant returns to scale technology, F(Kt;Lt), which is
concave, increasing with respect to the quantity of capital, denoted by Kt; and of labor, denoted
by Lt: F(Kt;Lt) satis￿es Inada conditions. All agents have access to a storage technology that
yields ￿ > 0 units of the numeraire good at date t + 1 for 1 unit stored at date t. Only ￿nanciers,
who are specialized intermediaries, can successfully lend to ￿rms (think of them, for example, as
having devoted their ￿rst-period labor endowment to the acquisition of unique monitoring and
6asset management skills).
Agents enjoy late-life consumption only. Agents working in the production sector get the wage
wt in early life. Financiers get no wage in early life, but make a living out of the intermediation
margin they extract by borrowing from lenders and lending to ￿rms. Hence, workers provide for
late-life consumption either by storing their wage or by lending it to ￿nanciers.
Capital depreciates at rate ￿ 2 [0;1]: We denote by kt = Kt=Nt the amount of capital per worker
and by ‘t ￿ Lt=Nt the share of the working population engaged in the productive sector (i.e., 1￿‘t
is the size of the ￿nancial sector). With f (kt=‘t) = F(Kt;Lt)=Lt denoting the production function
in intensive form, pro￿t maximization by the ￿rm yields:
wt = f (kt=‘t) ￿ (kt=‘t)f0(kt=‘t) ￿ !(kt=‘t); (1)
rt + ￿ = f0 (kt=‘t): (2)
In what follows we refer to 1 + rt as the (gross) ￿productive￿rate, as opposed to the ￿interest
rate￿ that ￿nanciers promise to workers, which we denote by 1 + ￿t. Henceforth we will focus
on the non trivial case where the gross productive rate is strictly larger than the returns on the
storage technology (the conditions ensuring that this will indeed be the case in equilibrium are
given below.)
1.2 Labor allocation
Agents choose their occupation (or sector) according to the terminal consumption that they expect
from working in either sector. Occupation choice is made at the beginning of life. It is irreversible.
In equilibrium, free entry in both sectors will ensure that expected payo⁄s are equalized and will
determine the equilibrium size of each sector. We assume that there are market frictions in the
￿nancial sector, which allow ￿nanciers to earn a positive unit intermediation margin and thus ￿nd
this occupation worthwhile.
1.2.1 The ￿nancial sector
After workers have decided to engage in the production sector, they start looking for a ￿nancier
to whom they will lend their wage income at the end of the period. Producers are randomly
matched with ￿nanciers according to a standard ￿urn-ball￿ model (e.g., Hall, 1977) whereby a
particular worker meets any active ￿nancier with equal probability, 1=(Nt ￿ Lt), while ￿nanciers
can be matched with as many workers as they happen to meet.6 After the match has taken place,
6In this framework, a worker is matched with (at most) one ￿nancier at any point in time, while the ex-post
numbers of ￿nanciers￿customers is a Poisson distributed random variable with parameter ‘t=(1 ￿ ‘t). Indeed, the
probability that a ￿nancier is matched with any particular worker is 1=(Nt￿Lt): Then, the probability that a ￿nancier
7the worker and the ￿nancier bargain over the joint surplus to be earned from the relationship, and
we denote by ~ ￿ 2 (0;1) the share of the surplus that accrues to a ￿nancier in a particular match.
Importantly, the monopolistic power of the ￿nancier at this stage is limited by the fact that workers
can decline the deal and restart searching for a ￿nancier (with the same random matching process);
however, for time constraints they can only search for a ￿nite number of times ￿ ￿ 1. We show in
Appendix A1 that the outcome of this random matching and bargaining process is the following:
i) workers strike a deal with the ￿rst ￿nancier that they meet; ii) the interest rate on which they
agree to deal is:
1 + ￿t+1 = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rt+1); (3)
where ￿ ￿ ~ ￿￿ 2 (0;1). In the remainder of the paper we shall refer to the composite parameter
￿ as the market power of ￿nanciers. This market power can be high (low) either because their
bargaining power in a particular match, ~ ￿, is high (low), and/or because lenders￿ability to meet
alternative trading partners, as measured by ￿, is high (low).
Equation (3) expresses the interest rate as a weighted sum of the returns on the two underlying
technologies, storage and production. When ￿nanciers enjoy much market power, they are able to
keep the interest rate accruing to workers close to the relatively low storage return (that is, the
ultimate outside option for workers). On the contrary, when ￿nanciers have little market power
their rent is limited and the interest rate must remain close to the relatively high productive rate.
It is convenient to rewrite (3) in terms of the intermediation margin that ￿nanciers are able to
extract from their matches with workers:
rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1 = ￿(1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿): (4)
In equation (4), the return di⁄erence 1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿ is the economywide surplus, per unit of
savings, from investing in the production sector rather than storing. Then, the intermediation
margin rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1 is the fraction of this unit surplus that accrues to ￿nanciers.
1.2.2 Occupational choice
Agents born at date t must choose at beginning of date t whether to become a worker or a ￿-
nancier, on the basis of the expected date t+1 consumption from either occupation. The terminal















This binomial distribution converges towards the Poisson distribution with parameter Lt=(Nt ￿ Lt) = ‘t=(1 ￿ ‘t)
when Lt and Nt ￿ Lt are su¢ ciently large. Hence, the probability that a ￿nancier is mached with b workers is
e
￿‘t=(1￿‘t) (‘t=(1 ￿ ‘t))
b =(b!).
8consumption of a worker born at date t who lends his savings to ￿nanciers is:
ct+1 = wt (1 + ￿t+1) (5)
Let us now turn to ￿nanciers. Their payo⁄ from any match is wt (rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1). Since they
are in number Nt ￿ Lt while workers are in number Lt, and given the assumed matching process,
the expected number of matches for a potential ￿nancier is ‘t=(1 ￿ ‘t). Hence the total expected






(rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1): (6)
Note that (6) is the expected consumption of an agent considering to become a ￿nancier, while
the actual (ex post) consumption level of a particular ￿nancier depends on his random realized
number of matches.
The equilibrium allocation of labor across sectors is determined by free entry. Since agents
are risk-neutral, they must get the same expected consumption from either occupation, so that we
must have Et(c
f
t+1) = ct+1. In what follows we may thus refer to ct+1 as ￿individual consumption￿ ,
de￿ned as aggregate consumption divided by the number of old agent at date t + 1, i.e., Nt+1.
Equating (5) and (6) and using (4), we ￿nd that the equilibrium share of the ￿nancial sector is:







which is positive provided that gross productive rate, 1+rt+1; is larger than the storage return, ￿.
The interpretation of equation (7) is straightforward: when the market power of ￿nancier, ￿, is
small, then so is the intermediation margin they are able to extract (see equation (4)) and thus
the attractiveness of the ￿nancial sector. If, on the contrary, ￿ is large (i.e., ￿nanciers have strong
market power), then the large implied margin attracts many agents into the ￿nancial sector ex
ante and hence the number of workers in the production sector is small. A version of the basic
overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985) is recovered as a particular
case of our framework when we set ￿ = 0, in which case ‘t = 1 for all t. At the extreme opposite,
the crowding out of human resources by the ￿nancial sector is maximum when ￿ = 1, in which case
‘t = ￿=(1 + rt+1). Similarly, changes in lenders￿outside option, ￿, alter the rent that ￿nanciers
can extract and thus the equilibrium size of the ￿nancial sector.
The e⁄ect of the productive rate, 1+rt+1, on labor allocation across sectors also has a straight-
forward interpretation. Financiers extract a rent from their exclusive access to ￿rms￿￿nancing.
When the productive rate increases, matched ￿nanciers are able to extract some of the additional
payo⁄ and hence the intermediation margin rises. This in turns raises the expected payo⁄ from
working in the ￿nancial sector and reduces the share of producers in the population. Unsurprisingly,
9this e⁄ect is scaled by the market power of ￿nanciers, as well as by producers￿outside investment
opportunities, since they both determine how much of the extra surplus ￿nanciers can extract from
an increase in the productive rate. Finally, note that the labor allocation equation (7) implies
that the size of the ￿nancial sector shrinks to zero as market frictions vanish. This is because in
our baseline speci￿cation ￿nanciers can handle an arbitrarily large number of customers once their
career choice is made and their access to asset markets is granted. Then, by no-arbitrage between
alternative career choices, a lower unit intermediation margin, rt+1￿￿t+1, induced by a small value
of ￿ must be o⁄set by an increase in the number of customers that any single ￿nancier can expect.
In the limit the intermediation margin shrinks to zero as ￿ ! 0 and a single ￿nancier, with measure
zero, manages all producers savings.
It should be noticed that the assumption that the (frictionless) optimal size of the ￿nancial sector
is zero is not an essential feature of our model. Appendix A2 studies an alternative speci￿cation
of the model wherein ￿nanciers have limited capacity and hence the number of customers that
any single ￿nancier can handle is bounded above (this may be viewed as a particular example of
increasing marginal cost to intermediation, where this cost becomes very large when the number
of clients exceeds some upper limit). In this situation, the optimal size of the ￿nancial sector is
bounded away from zero and whether market frictions make it too big or not, relative to the ￿rst
best, depends on the value of ￿; the market power of ￿nancier
2 Bubbleless equilibrium
2.1 Aggregate dynamics and steady state
In the bubbleless equilibrium workers￿savings transit through ￿nanciers￿hands and are then entirely
turned into productive capital. Since workers save their entire wage income, the law of motion for
capital is Kt+1 = wtLt, which we may rewrite as:
(1 + n)kt+1 = ‘t!(kt=‘t): (8)
On the other hand, equations (2) and (7) relate current occupational choices to the productive
rate, and hence to the stock of capital per producer in the next period:
‘t = 1 ￿ ￿ +
￿￿
f0 (kt+1=‘t+1) + 1 ￿ ￿
: (9)
Equations (8) and (9) de￿ne, together with the initial value of capital, k0; the equilibrium path
of (kt;‘t). It should be noticed that in contrast to capital, the share of ￿nanciers is forward-looking
because current occupational choices depend on anticipated payo⁄s and hence on the interest rate
that will prevail in the next period. In equation (9), ‘t is increasing in kt+1=‘t+1 since a high value
10of the latter ratio is associated with a low productive rate, which deters agents from working in the
￿nancial sector and thus raises the size of the productive sector. Note also that in the particular
case where ￿ = 0, equation (9) yields ‘t = 1 and hence from (8) the path of kt is described by the
univariate (Diamond-like) dynamics kt+1 = !(kt)=(1 + n). When ￿ > 0, on the contrary, the stock
of capital and the allocation of labor across sectors are jointly determined according to (8)￿ (9).
Let us denote by k￿ and ‘￿ the steady state values of capital per worker and the size of the
production sector, respectively, in the bubbleless equilibrium. From (8)￿ (9) we get:
‘￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ +
￿￿
f0 (￿￿1 (1 + n)) + 1 ￿ ￿
; k￿ = ￿￿1 (1 + n)‘￿; (10)
where ￿ (k=‘) ￿ !(k=‘)=(k=‘): We now make the following assumptions:
￿0 (:) < 0; ￿ (0) = +1; ￿ (+1) = 0; (A1)
f0 ￿
￿￿1 (1 + n)
￿
+ 1 ￿ ￿ > ￿: (A2)
Assumption (A1) ensures that the steady state de￿ned by (10) exists and is unique. (A2)
guarantees that in the bubbleless steady state the value of the productive rate (left hand side) is
always greater than the storage return (right hand side); this will imply that in the vicinity of
that steady state there will always be a range of interest rates, ￿t, allowing ￿nanciers to extract a
positive intermediation margin (i.e., rt+1 ￿￿t+1 > 0) while still be able to attract lenders￿deposits
(i.e., ￿t+1 > ￿).7
Note from (10) that output per worker in the bubbleless steady state, Y=N, is y￿ = ‘￿f (k￿=‘￿) =
‘￿f
￿
￿￿1 (1 + n)
￿
. Since under assumption (A2) the share of the population engaged in production,
‘￿, decreases with the market power of ￿nanciers, ￿, higher values of ￿ reduce output per worker.
Finally, from (5) and (10) individual consumption in the bubbleless steady state is given by:
c￿ (￿) = !(￿￿1 (1 + n))
￿
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
f0 ￿
￿￿1 (1 + n)
￿
+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿￿
; (11)
and thus decreases with ￿; the market power of ￿nanciers.
2.2 Stability and local dynamics
We focus on the behavior of the dynamic system in the vicinity of the steady state (k￿;‘￿): Log-
linearizing (8)￿ (9) around (k￿;‘￿) generates a two-dimensional linear system, the stability of which
depends on the number of characteristic roots inside the unit circle and the number of predeter-
mined variables in the system (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). We show in Appendix B1 that the
characteristic polynomial summarizing the local dynamics of the bubbleless equilibrium has either
7If this condition were not ful￿lled the equilibrium share of ￿nanciers would go to zero and the value of kt would
be constant and given by f
0(kt) + 1 ￿ ￿ = ￿.
11one or two roots inside the unit circle. Since the system has one predetermined variable (kt) and
one free variable (‘t), this implies that either there is a unique equilibrium trajectory converging
towards (k￿;‘￿) and indexed by k0 (determinacy), or this equilibrium is surrounded by an in￿nity of
equilibrium trajectories converging towards (k￿;‘￿) and indexed by (k0;‘0) (indeterminacy). More
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where ￿￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿￿ > 0 denote the elasticity of the real wage and (minus) that of the productive




; ￿￿ ￿ ￿
(k￿=‘￿)f00 (k￿=‘￿)
f0 (k￿=‘￿) + 1 ￿ ￿
: (13)
Condition (12) is not strong. For example, it is satis￿ed for all feasible values of the other
parameters in the Cobb-Douglas case, where y = k￿ and hence ￿￿ = ￿, as long as ￿ ￿ 1=3. It is
also satis￿ed for any value of ￿ when ￿ ￿ 1=2. In any case, it is satis￿ed provided that the return on
storage, ￿; lies su¢ ciently below the steady state gross productive return f0 ￿
￿￿1 (1 + n)
￿
+1￿￿. In
the remainder of the paper we shall work out the dynamics of the model for the case where condition
(12) is satis￿ed, so that k0 uniquely pins down ‘0 and sets the economy on the unique equilibrium
trajectory converging towards (k￿;‘￿). However, since our results on the welfare impact of rational
bubbles follow from the asymptotic properties of the bubbly equilibrium and that indeterminacy
also implies convergence towards the steady state, this focus is for expositional clarity and should
not be seen as essential in our analysis.
Under condition (12) the local dynamics of kt in the bubbleless equilibrium is governed by the
unique stable root of the system, denoted by p1, and we have (see Appendix B for details):
kt = (1 ￿ p1)k￿ + p1kt￿1; p1 2 (0;1): (14)
This dynamics is represented in Figure 2. Given kt, equation (14) uniquely determines kt+1.
3 Bubbly equilibrium
3.1 Dynamics and steady state
We now derive the bubbly equilibrium of our economy and compare it to the bubbleless equilibrium.
We assume that bubbles, like claims to the capital stock, can only be traded by ￿nanciers. Hence,
in the bubbly equilibrium ￿nanciers who enter the market buy bubbly assets from those who leave
the market against the numeraire good that they have borrowed from young producers. In their





Figure 2: Bubbly and bubbleless equilibria
balance with producers. This implies that ￿nanciers￿intermediation margin now includes some of
the capital gains earned by ￿riding the bubble￿ .
For expositional clarity we focus on ￿pure￿bubbles with no underlying real asset, but it would
be straightforward to introduce a tree with constant payo⁄ and to interpret the bubble as the
di⁄erence between the trading price of this tree and its fundamental value (as in Tirole, 1985).
Moreover, we only study equilibria that are ￿asymptotically bubbly￿ , that is, equilibria in which
the bubble per worker has strictly positive steady state value. We make speci￿c assumptions below
ensuring the existence of such equilibrium paths, along which the bubble per worker does not vanish
asymptotically.
In the bubbly equilibrium, total savings are invested in the production technology as well as in
the bubble, i.e., Bt + Kt+1 = wtLt. Denoting by bt = Bt=Nt the value of the bubble per worker at
the end of date t, we have:
bt + (1 + n)kt+1 = ‘t!(kt=‘t) (15)
On the other hand, the absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that from the point of view
of ￿nanciers the return on trading the bubble be equal to that on investing in the production
13technology, i.e., Bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)Bt. From (2), we must thus have:
bt+1 =
￿




Along an asymptotically bubbly equilibrium the steady state value of the bubble per worker is
constant and positive, implying that the ratio in (16) is equal to one. From (7) and (15)￿ (16) and
the properties of f(:), the bubbly steady state (kb;‘b;b) is unique and given by:
‘b = 1 ￿ ￿ +
￿￿
1 + n












The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with asymptotically
positive asset bubble is !(kb=‘b)=
￿
kb=‘b￿
= ￿(kb=‘b) > 1 + n. Since ￿0(:) < 0 (from Assumption
(A1)) and 1 + n = ￿(k￿=‘￿) (see (10)), steady state bubbles exist if and only if kb=‘b < k￿=‘￿, i.e.,
if and only if the bubble asymptotically crowds out capital per worker in the productive sector.
Equivalently, steady state bubbles are possible if and only if the real interest rate is higher in the
bubbly steady state than in the bubbleless one, i.e., f0(kb=‘b) = n + ￿ > f0 (k￿=‘￿) = ￿￿1 (1 + n).
Hence we can make sure that asymptotically bubbly equilibria exist by assuming that the following
condition holds:
n + ￿ < f0 ￿
￿￿1 (1 + n)
￿
(A3)
For example, if the production function is f(k) = k￿; this condition boils down to n + ￿ >
￿(1 + n)=(1 ￿ ￿).
Note ￿rst that even though the existence of a steady state with positive bubble is related to the
production technology, the population growth rate and the rate of depreciation, it does not depend
on the market power of ￿nanciers. However, the size of the bubble per worker depends on ‘b and
thus on ￿. Second, the higher productive rate that prevails in the bubbly steady state (relative to
that in the bubbleless steady state) is associated with a more attractive ￿nancial sector and hence
a smaller size of the production sector, i.e., ‘b < ‘￿. Finally, since kb=‘b < k￿=‘￿ while ‘b < ‘￿, it
follows that kb < k￿, i.e., the bubble crowds out capital per worker. We summarize these results
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For all feasible values of ￿ the bubbly steady state has lower capital per worker,
k, greater productive rate, f0(k=‘) + 1 ￿ ￿, and a larger ￿nancial sector, 1 ￿ ‘, than the bubbleless
steady state.
The impact of general equilibrium asset bubbles on the capital stock and the rental rate in
the long run are well known since the work of Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987). The novelty here
is that di⁄erences in capital per worker between the bubbly and the bubbleless equilibria a⁄ect
occupational choices (through their impact on the productive rate) and thus the allocation of labor
14across sectors. In short, bubbles crowd out productive labor, in addition to crowding out productive
capital. Finally, from (5) and (17) individual consumption in the bubbly steady state is given by:
cb(￿) = !(f0￿1 (n + ￿))[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + n)]; (18)
and hence decreases with the market power of ￿nanciers, ￿.
3.2 Stability and local dynamics
We proceed as in Section 2.2 and derive the dynamics of the system in the vicinity of the bubbly
steady state. Moreover, since we wish to compare equilibrium trajectories that, for a particular level
of initial capital k0, may converge towards either the bubbleless steady state or the bubbly steady
state, we assume that the two steady states under scrutiny lie in the vicinity of each other.8 We
can then show (see Appendix C for details) that the steady state (kb;‘b;b) is determinate provided
that condition (12) is satis￿ed, implying that the bubbly equilibrium (kt;‘t;bt) is locally unique.
As is shown in Appendix C, around the bubbly steady state the dynamics of the capital stock
can be ￿rst-order approximated as follows:
kt = (1 ￿ ~ p1)kb + ~ p1kt￿1; ~ p1 2 (0;1); (19)
where ~ p1 is the (unique) stable root of the bubbly system (see Figure 1 again). Since kb < k￿, the
dynamics of kt along the bubbly equilibrium crosses the 45-degree line below that of the bubbleless
equilibrium. Moreover, since kb and k￿ are close to each other (by assumption), an initial level of
capital k0 that is close to one of them is close to both and may set in motion a dynamics converging
towards either k￿ or kb. We now analyze the implications of the crowding out of productive labor
by the ￿nancial sector for the dynamic e¢ ciency of rational bubbles.
4 Labor crowding out and dynamic e¢ ciency
In the limiting case where the ￿nancial sector is perfectly competitive (i.e., ￿ = 0), the size of the
￿nancial sector is zero and our model collapses into a version of Diamond￿ s (1965). Consequently,
the standard results applies that rational bubbles can exist only to the extend that they restore
dynamic e¢ ciency (Tirole, 1985). The question that we ask in this Section is: Do bubbles keep
their e¢ ciency properties when the market power of ￿nanciers allows them to seize part of the free
lunch generated by asset bubbles?
It would seem, at ￿rst sight, that the answer should be ￿yes￿ : since the bubbly equilibrium
is associated with a higher productive rate than the bubbleless equilibrium, and that the overall
8See Caballero et al. (2005) for a similar approach, based on linarizing the relevant systems around two points
that are distinct from, but arbitrarily close to, each other.
15surplus associated with this higher rate is shared between ￿nanciers and workers, agents in both
sectors should bene￿t (or at least not su⁄er) from the bubble. In short, it would seem that the size
of rent extraction by the ￿nancial sector should a⁄ect the way the e¢ ciency gains associated with
the bubble are shared amongst agents, but not the dynamic e¢ ciency of the bubble per se.
This reasoning is wrong, however, for it ignores the e⁄ects of rent extraction by the ￿nancial
sector on occupational choices and the implied distortion in the allocation of labor across sectors. As
a ￿rst illustration of this potential welfare loss, assume that ￿nanciers are able to extract the largest
possible rent, i.e., ￿ = 1. Then, equations (11) and (18) imply that consumption in the bubbleless
steady state equilibrium is c￿ (1) = ￿!(k￿=‘￿), while consumption in the bubbly equilibrium is
cb (1) = ￿!(kb=‘b). Since kb=‘b < k￿=‘￿ and !0(k=‘) < 0, it follows that cb (1) < c￿ (1) and hence
rational bubbles cannot be dynamically e¢ cient (i.e., some generations, possibly located far into
the future, are better o⁄ without rather than with bubbles). The following proposition generalizes
this reasoning for the case where ￿ < 1:
Proposition 2. The bubbly steady state has higher individual consumption than the bubbleless
steady state if and only if rent extraction by the ￿nancial sector is not too large, i.e., if and only if
￿ < ￿￿, where ￿￿ 2 (0;1).
Proof. We must compare c￿ (￿) (de￿ned by equation (11)) and cb (￿) (given by equation (18)) for
￿ 2 [0;1]. For ￿; n and ￿ given, c￿ (￿) and cb (￿) are continuous and linearly decreasing in ￿ 2 [0;1],
while cb (0) > c￿ (0) and cb (1) < c￿ (1) (see Figure 3). The ￿rst inequality is necessarily true
from the asymptotic e¢ ciency of bubbles in the Diamond-Tirole economy (which we recover when
￿ = 0). The second inequality is equivalent to !
￿




￿￿1 (1 + n)
￿
, which is also true
under Assumption (A3) since !0 (:) = ￿f00 (:) > 0. Hence there is a unique ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that
cb (￿￿) = c￿ (￿￿), to the left (right) of which cb (￿) > (<)c￿ (￿). QED
The central implication of Proposition 2 is that the bubbleless equilibrium cannot be dynam-
ically e¢ cient when rent extraction by the ￿nancial sector is too severe. This is because, given
￿ > ￿￿ and k0 close to both kb and k￿; convergence towards kb necessarily implies a consumption
loss in ￿nite time, relative to convergence towards k￿.
The consumption loss incurred by generations located su¢ ciently far into the future when
￿ > ￿￿ does obviously not imply that all generations necessarily su⁄er from the bubble. In our
model, bubbles a⁄ect welfare through two competing forces: they crowd out of productive capital
e¢ ciently, but crowd out productive labor ine¢ ciently. Ultimately, the welfare impact of bubbles
along the transition towards the steady state depends on the relative strength of these two forces
at di⁄erent points in time.





Figure 3: c￿ (￿) and cb (￿)
Let us illustrate this point by means of the following example, which shows how early generations
may bene￿t from the bubble, even though ￿ > ￿￿ and hence late generations are bound to su⁄er
from it. Assume that k0 = K0=N0 = k￿, so that ct = c￿ in (11) for all t ￿ 1 if the economy settles
on the bubbleless dynamics at date 0. This path is represented by the bold horizontal lines in
Figure 4. From equation (11), as ￿ is raised, the c￿-line shifts downwards and workers￿expected
consumption at all dates falls.
Now consider what happens in the bubbly equilibrium. From equation (18), the asymptotic
consumption level of workers, represented by the cb-line (dotted line), shifts downwards as ￿ in-
creases; and by Proposition 2, it shifts more than the c￿-line whenever ￿ > ￿￿. In this situation,
some future generations are bound to incur a welfare loss if the economy settles on the bubbly
equilibrium.
The opposite occurs in the short-run. Indeed, use (5) and (9) to write the consumption of
workers born at date 0 as follows:




















‘0 + ￿ ￿ 1
￿
:
Since !0 (k=‘) > 0 while k0 is given this last equation implies that consumption of individuals
born at date 0 decreases with the size of the productive sector, ‘0: We can then show that the size
of the productive sector at date zero is smaller in the bubbly equilibrium than in the bubbleless
equilibrium, so that the consumption of individuals born at date zero is always higher in the bubbly
equilibrium than in the bubbleless equilibrium. This can be proven by contradiction. First, let us
de￿ne the variable xt ￿ kt=‘t, so that ^ xt = ^ kt￿^ ‘t, and note that for k0 = k￿ we have x￿
1 = k0=‘￿
0 = x￿
17in the bubbleless equilibrium.9 In the bubbly equilibrium, we have xb





Now, suppose that ‘b
0 > ‘￿
0. From equation (9), this would imply that xb
1 > x￿, that is,















> x￿ ￿ xb: (20)
We know from equation (19) that ~ p1 < 1 and from Proposition 1 that x￿ ￿ xb > 0. Thus,
inequality (20) cannot hold for ‘b
0 > ‘￿
0: Hence, it must be the case that ‘b
0 < ‘￿




After date 0, factor payments in the bubbly equilibrium gradually (and monotonically) adjust
towards their steady state values (since convergence is monotonic in kt). Given this gradual ad-
justment, several generations may enjoy the consumption boom generated by the early stages of
the bubble. When ￿ < ￿￿ (i.e., rents are small), we have that cb (￿) > c￿ (￿) and individual con-
sumption may at all dates be higher in the bubbly equilibrium than in the bubbleless equilibrium
(this situation is depicted in the left hand panel of Figure 4); when such is the case, the standard
result that the bubbly equilibrium is dynamically e¢ cient while the bubbleless equilibrium is not
applies. However, when ￿ > ￿￿, cb (￿) lies below c￿ (￿) and the bubbly equilibrium is bound to lose
its welfare-improving properties (right hand panel of Figure 4). To summarize, when the initial
stock of capital is close to the steady state value of the bubbleless equilibrium, the bubbly path is
associated with higher consumption per worker in the short run, but bubbles reduce welfare in the
long run when the market power of ￿nanciers is too large.
5 Asset bubble and income inequalities
In this section, we extend the analysis above in order to study the impact of bubbles on income
inequalities. The starting point of this extension is the observation by Philippon and Reshef￿ s (2008)
that the U.S. ￿nancial sector has been highly skill-intensive in the past couple of decades, following
of the high pace of deregulation and ￿nancial innovation over the period. We introduce this feature
into our analysis by dividing the working population into ￿skilled￿ and ￿unskilled￿ individuals,
and by assuming that the productive sector makes use of both labor types while asset trading can
be carried out by skilled labor only. In short, skilled individuals have the ability choose between
becoming a ￿managers￿ or a ￿banker￿ , while unskilled individuals hold mostly non-transferable
(i.e., industry-speci￿c) competences and cannot move out of the productive sector. In this context,
an asset bubble triggers a ￿ ight of skilled labor into the ￿nancial sector, raising the scarcity of
9The proof also works when k0 is in the vicinity of k
￿:
10The latter expression directely follows from local equilibrium dynamics of the bubbly equilibrium, in which
^ kt = ~ p1^ kt￿1 and ^ ‘t = ￿^ kt, where ￿ is a constant. This implies that ^ xt+1 = ~ p1^ xt, and hence x
b
1 = x
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Figure 4: Consumption dynamics
skilled labor in the productive sector. In consequence, the marginal product of skilled (unskilled)
labor is raised (diminished), the skill premium increases, possibly to the bene￿t of skilled and the
detriment of the unskilled.
5.1 Labor allocation under skill heterogeneity
There are Nt skilled individuals and Lu;t = uNt unskilled individuals in the population (hence total
population is now (1 + u)Nt). We now use Lt to denote the number of skilled workers engaged
in production. With this notation, which allows us to directly generalize the previous model,
‘t = Lt=Nt and 1 ￿ ‘t are now the shares of skilled workers engaged in production and ￿nance,
respectively, while skilled and unskilled workers are in proportion 1=(1 + u) and u=(1 + u) in the
population, respectively. Similarly, we now use wt to denote the wage of skilled workers and wu;t
that of unskilled workers.
Production now requires both labor types, and for simplicity we assume that the production







or, in intensive form, yt = ￿k￿
t ‘
￿
t , with ￿ ￿ Au1￿￿￿￿. First, equating the marginal product of
capital to the user cost of capital gives the following gross productive rate:
1 + rt = ￿￿k￿￿1
t ‘
￿
t + 1 ￿ ￿: (22)
Second, equating the marginal product of each labor type to the corresponding real wages, we





(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)‘t
: (23)
19Finally, since ‘t 2 [0;1] we can make sure that skilled workers always earn a higher wage than
unskilled workers by assuming that
u > (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)=￿ (A4)
If (A4) did not hold, unskilled labor could be so scarce, and consequently well remunerated in
equilibrium, that skilled workers would prefer to go for unskilled jobs in the productive sector than
working in the ￿nancial sector; this would lead the size of the latter to shrink to zero.
Equation (23) indicates that the skill premium is increased as the share of skilled workers in
the productive sector goes down. In other words, increases in the size of the ￿nancial sector raise
wage inequalities. This occurs for two reasons. First, for a given quantity of capital and unskilled
labor in production, a reduction in the availability of skilled labor in that sector raises its relative
price, wt. Second, a lower level of skilled labor in the productive sector reduces the productivity of
unskilled labor and hence the corresponding real wage, wu;t.
As is shown in Appendix A1, the bargaining outcome that generates the equilibrium interest
rate, ￿t+1, as a function of the productive rate, rt+1, is independent of the size of individual
savings brought to the ￿nancier (equal to wt or wu;t here); hence equations (3)￿ (4) also apply to
the economy with two labor types and uniquely determines the interest rate ￿t+1. We denote by
cu;t+1 = wu;t (1 + ￿t+1) and ct+1 = wt (1 + ￿t+1) the terminal consumption of an unskilled worker
and that of a skilled worker engaged in production, respectively. There are Nt ￿ Lt ￿nanciers,
who extract the intermediation margin rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1 and meet depositors according to the same
random matching process as before. For any particular ￿nancier, the expected number of matches
with skilled worker engaged in production is ‘t=(1 ￿ ‘t), while any match with a skilled leads to
a deposit collection of wt. On the other hand, the expected number of matches with unskilled
workers is u=(1 ￿ ‘t), while any match with an unskilled worker leads to the collection of wut units
of savings. Hence, using (23) we ￿nd that the (expected) terminal consumption of a skilled worker
















wt (rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1);
which generalizes equation (6) above.
Since by assumption the demand for unskilled labor by the ￿nancial sector is zero, the absence
of arbitrage opportunities across alternative career choices applies to skilled workers only. Equating
ct+1 and Et(c
f
t+1), we ￿nd that in equilibrium the share of skilled workers choosing to work in the
￿nancial sector is
1 ￿ ‘t =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿(1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ (1 + rt+1)
; (24)
20which generalizes equation (7) above. It is easy to check from (24) that @‘t=@rt+1 < 0, that is, a
higher productive rate attracts more skilled workers into ￿nance, due to the greater intermediation
margin to be earned there. Taken together, equations (23) and (24) indicate that a higher produc-
tive rate is associated with a greater skill premium. Moreover, since the interest rate is the same
for all workers, we have ct+1=cu;t+1 = wt=wu;t, so that wage inequalities are directly re￿ ected into
consumption inequalities.
5.2 Bubbleless equilibrium
Using the expressions for wt and wu;t derived from (21) and rearranging, we ￿nd that total savings
are wu;tLu;t + wtLt = (1 ￿ ￿)wtLt=￿. In the bubbleless equilibrium all these savings are invested
into next period￿ s capital stock, Kt+1. Hence the capital accumulation equation can be written as:




The dynamics of the bubbleless equilibrium is described by a two-dimensional system formed
by the labor allocation equation (24) (with the productive rate rt+1 given by (22)) and the capital
accumulation equation (25).
We solve the model with skill heterogeneity in the same way as we solved the basic model. We
￿rst compute the steady state of the bubbleless equilibrium. It will then be compared to the bubbly
analogue, with particular attention being paid to asymptotic levels of capital and consumption per
worker. Second, we examine the local stability of this equilibrium to show that it exists and is
unique under condition (12). This second step is carried out in Appendix C and, for the sake of
conciseness, not detailed here.
From equations (22) and (25), the value of the productive rate at the bubbleless steady state
is:
1 + r￿ =
￿(1 + n)
(1 ￿ ￿)
+ 1 ￿ ￿:
The steady state value of the other variables can then be computed sequentially: the share of
skilled labor in production, ‘￿, is uniquely determined by (24) and the value of r￿, while capital
per worker, k￿; can be computed from r￿ and ‘￿ using (22). Finally, note that assumption (A2) is
still assumed to hold here, i.e., ￿(1 + n)=(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ ￿ > ￿:
5.3 Bubbly equilibrium
In the bubbly equilibrium, aggregate savings, (1 ￿ ￿)wtLt=￿, are used to ￿nance the purchase
of capital stock, Kt+1, and the aggregate bubble Bt. Hence the capital accumulation equation
becomes:




21where, by our normalization, bt = Bt=Nt now denotes the bubble per skilled worker. The absence







Equation (26)￿ (27), together with (22) and (24), fully describe the dynamics of the bubbly
equilibrium.
As usual, the steady state of the bubbly equilibrium satis￿es bt+1 = bt and hence the ￿golden-
rule￿relation rb = n. The existence of asymptotically bubbly equilibria is ensured if the value of
the bubble per skilled worker in the steady state, b; is positive. From (22) and (26), this is the case





￿ ￿ < rb = n: (28)
Again, the bubbly steady state (kb;‘b;b) can be computed sequentially as follows. Substituting
n for rt+1 in (24) gives ‘b. With ‘b and rb known, the steady state counterpart of (22) uniquely
determine kb. Finally, kb and ‘b can be substituted into the steady state counterpart of (26) to
￿nd b. Moreover, and as is shown in Appendix C, the bubbly steady state is determinate under
condition (12) provided that kb is su¢ ciently close to k￿ (or, equivalently, that b is su¢ ciently
small). This establishes the local uniqueness of the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium.
5.4 Dynamic e¢ ciency
The central implication of the heterogenous skill model is that asset bubbles a⁄ect relative wages
and consumption levels through their e⁄ect on the allocation of skilled workers across sectors. We
focus here on the comparison of steady state consumption levels, and rely on the local stability of
both equilibria to argue that, starting from k0 su¢ ciently close to k￿ and kb, these consumption
levels will asymptotically converge towards their steady state value. The following proposition
establishes that, as a result of rising income inequalities, unskilled workers are the ￿rst to bear the
cost of the misallocation of labor generated by asset bubbles.
Proposition 3. There exists a threshold level for the market power of ￿nanciers, denoted by
￿￿
u 2 (0;1); such that the consumption of unskilled workers is lower in the bubbly than in the
bubbleless steady state whenever ￿ > ￿￿
u. In the vicinity of ￿ = ￿￿
u the steady state consumption
level of skilled workers is higher in the bubbly steady state than in the bubbleless steady state.
Proof. In Appendix D.
Proposition 3 identi￿es a new source of breakdown of dynamic e¢ ciency under endogenous
occupational choice, namely, the fact that the bubble may be harmful to unskilled workers even
22when it bene￿ts skilled workers. This is notably the case when ￿ is higher than, but close to ￿￿
u.
Note also that the opposite cannot occur: because all depositors are paid the same interest rate
while the bubble raises wage inequalities, it cannot be that the bubble raises the consumption of the
unskilled while lowering that of the skilled (relative to the bubbleless equilibrium). Importantly,
the proposition does not establish an upper threshold of ￿ above which skilled workers would lose;
in fact, one can easily construct examples in which the consumption of the skilled is higher in the
bubbly than in the bubbleless equilibrium for all possible values of ￿ (see below); in contrast, there
always exists such a threshold for the unskilled.
To get further insight into the redistributive e⁄ects of asset bubbles under heterogenous skills, it
may be useful to draw the values of key steady state variables as a function of ￿; the market power
of ￿nanciers. Our ￿rst example, which uses A = u = ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1=3, ￿ = 1=2; ￿ = 0:5 and n = 0:1,
is depicted in Figure 5. For all values of ￿, the bubbly steady state (bold curves) is associated
with a larger ￿nancial sector, lower wages and greater wage inequalities than the bubbleless steady
state. Crucially, there are now two threshold levels for ￿ (instead of one as in Figure 2): ￿￿
u, above
which unskilled workers asymptotically su⁄er from the bubble, and ￿￿
s, above which skilled workers
asymptotically su⁄er from the bubble. Since ￿￿
u < ￿￿
s (as is consistent with Proposition 3), there
is a range of market powers within which the bubbly steady state is bene￿cial to the skilled but
detrimental to the unskilled, relative to the bubbleless steady state.
The second example, depicted in Figure 6, uses the same parameters as those of the ￿rst
example except for the fact that we set ￿ = 1=3 and u = 1:2. In this situation, we still have a
threshold ￿￿
u 2 (0;1) for the unskilled, but no such a threshold for the skilled: these always bene￿t
from the bubble asymptotically. A central di⁄erence with the previous example, and one that is
responsible for this result, is that here bubbles turn out to raise the wage income of skilled workers
for su¢ ciently high values of ￿. To understand why this is the case, recall that the skilled wage
is wt = ￿￿k￿
t ‘
￿￿1
t in equilibrium. On the one hand, the bubbly steady state has lower capital
per worker than the bubbleless steady state, which pushes this wage down; on the other hand, the
bubbly steady state has fewer skilled workers in the production sector, which raises their marginal
product and hence pushes their wage up. Ultimately the impact of the bubble on the (steady
state) equilibrium wage of skilled workers depends on these two forces. When the market power
of ￿nanciers is su¢ ciently strong, the brain drain from production to speculation that takes place
in the bubbly equilibrium may cause the second e⁄ect to dominate, resulting in higher wages and
higher consumption levels. In other words, the model explains not only why bubbles raise income
inequalities, but also how they may lead to an absolute increase in both the wage and capital income
of skilled workers. Hence, our model is consistent with the observed rise in U.S. top incomes that
occurred from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2010) and the related
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Figure 5: Example of steady state with A = u = ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1=3, ￿ = 1=2; ￿ = 0:5 and n = 0:1
increase in wage inequalities in the U.S. labor market (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006), which
precisely occurred at a time when the ￿nancial sector attracted much skilled labor.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the e⁄ect of rational bubbles in an economy where asset trading requires
specialized intermediaries having optimally chosen this occupation. Our main result is that while
asset bubbles raise the attractiveness of the ￿nancial sector and divert labor out of productive
activities and into speculative ones, the extent and social costs of this diversion crucially depend
on the size of the speculative rents that intermediaries are able to extract in equilibrium. Ignoring
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Figure 6: Example of steady state with A = ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1=3, ￿ = 1=3; ￿ = 0:5; u = 1:2 and n = 0:1:
25skill heterogeneity, we showed that bubbles lose their Pareto-improving properties as soon as the
￿labor crowding out￿induced by rents in the ￿nancial sector becomes su¢ ciently serious to o⁄set
the usual bene￿cial e⁄ects of capital crowding out. Hence, while our analysis lends support to the
conventional view that asset bubbles may be detrimental to productive activities, it also suggests
that part of the issue lies in the interaction of bubbles with rents, rather than in the existence of
bubbles per se. Finally, introducing skill heterogeneity allowed us to show that bubbles raise income
inequalities, so that not all agents are equally a⁄ected by the occurrence of bubbles. In particular,
low-skilled workers are the ￿rst to be hit by the worsening of the rent-extraction problem caused
by the asset bubble. This central role of rents in determining the welfare and redistributive e⁄ects
of bubbles may provide another justi￿cation for regulating the ￿nancial sector, complementary to
those based on ￿nancial stability concerns.
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29Appendix
A. Matching and bargaining outcomes
A1. Baseline speci￿cation
We work out the solution to the matching and bargaining process backwards. Consider the
match between a ￿nancier and a depositor having reached the ￿th bargaining round, and call
￿￿;t+1 the bargained interest rate resulting from the match. The depositor￿ s payo⁄ from the
match is wt (1 + ￿￿;t+1) and his outside option wt￿; so his surplus from the match is Sw
￿;t+1 =
wt (1 + ￿￿;t+1 ￿ ￿). Since the ￿nancier￿ s outside option is zero, his surplus from this match is
S
f




￿;t+1) = ~ ￿wt (1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿), which by de￿nition is equal to wt (rt+1 ￿ ￿￿;t+1). Hence the unit in-
termediation margin that a ￿nancier extracts from a match with a depositor in his ￿th bargaining
round is:
rt+1 ￿ ￿￿;t+1 = ~ ￿(1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿)
Now consider what happens in the (￿ ￿ 1)th match of a depositor, and call ￿￿￿1;t+1 the interest
that results from the bargaining process. The depositor￿ s gain from the match is wt (1 + ￿￿￿1;t+1)
while the outside option is now wt (1 + ￿￿;t+1) (i.e., what can be extracted from the following
match), so the surplus from this (￿ ￿ 1)th match is Sw
￿￿1;t+1 = wt (￿￿￿1;t+1 ￿ ￿￿;t+1). On the other
hand the ￿nancier￿ s outside option on a particular match is still 0, so his surplus from this match
is S
f
￿￿1;t+1 = wt (rt+1 ￿ ￿￿￿1;t+1). The condition that S
f




following intermediation margin to the ￿nancier:
rt+1 ￿ ￿￿￿1;t+1 = ~ ￿(rt+1 ￿ ￿￿;t+1) = ~ ￿2 (1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿)
Note that for both parties the gain from this (￿ ￿ 1)th match is higher than their outside options
(i.e., ￿￿￿1;t+1 > ￿￿;t+1 and rt+1 ￿ ￿￿￿1;t+1 > 0), so both agree to strike a deal at this stage. By
the same logic, repeated ￿ times, both parties agree to strike a deal at the ￿rst match, giving the
￿nancier an intermediation margin:
rt+1 ￿ ￿1;t+1 = ~ ￿(rt+1 ￿ ￿2;t+1) = ~ ￿2 (rt+1 ￿ ￿3;t+1) = :::
= ~ ￿￿￿1 (rt+1 ￿ ￿￿;t+1) = ~ ￿￿ (1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿):
This is exactly equation (4) in the body of the paper since ￿t+1, the prevailing interest rate,
is the one that result from (all) depositors￿unit gain from their ￿rst bargaining round, ￿1;t+1.
Equation (3) is a rewriting of (4). Combined with the expected payo⁄associated with either career
(5)￿ (6), we get the labor allocation equation (7).
30A2. Maximum ￿nanciers￿capacity and minimal ￿nancial sector size
In this appendix we modify the bargaining process leading to the labor allocation equation (7) to
allow for a non-zero optimal ￿nancial sector size. First, we limit ￿nanciers￿capacity by assuming
that every ￿nancier can handle a maximum number of customers ￿ > 0; this can be viewed
as an extreme form of increasing marginal cost to intermediation, with the marginal cost being
(normalized to) zero below and up until ￿ clients and prohibitive above ￿ clients. Second, we
assume that ￿nanciers must cluster to form partnerships, or "banks". There is a large number
of such banks (i.e., the typical bank has vanishingly small size), so that the probability that a
depositor is re-matched with the same bank were the deal to fail is zero; hence for any bank the
outside option in any match is zero, as in our baseline speci￿cation. However, the payo⁄ risk
generated by the randomness of the matching process is assumed to be fully diversi￿ed within
the bank, so that Lt=(Nt ￿ Lt) = ‘t=(1 ￿ ‘t) is the ex post (rather than expected) number of
matches for any ￿nanciers. Full risk diversi￿cation within the bank implies that we can treat
￿nanciers symmetrically; without this assumption, some ￿nanciers would be matched with less
than ￿ customers while some other would reach their maximum capacity and their would be ex
post heterogeneity amongst ￿nanciers.
There are two regimes in this economy. The ￿rst regime is associated with relative large values
of ￿ and generates sizeable frictional rents. In this situation the endogenous size of the ￿nancial
sector (as determined by (7)) is such that ￿nanciers are in su¢ ciently large number (relative to
the number of producers) for every ￿nancier to work below their maximum capacity. Hence the
capacity constraint is not binding and the equilibrium outcome is as in the baseline speci￿cation
presented in the body of the paper.
In the second regime, which is associated with relative low values of ￿, rents are too small to
sustain a large ￿nancial sector. In this situation the bargaining process described in Section A1
and leading to the interest rate in (3) is no longer valid, because by assumption the marginal cost
to intermediation would cause ￿nanciers￿surplus to vanish. Instead, the allocation of labor across
sector operates in a perfectly competitive fashion, with the equilibrium value of the interest rate
being that which exactly ensures equal payo⁄prospects across carrier choices. With ‘t=(1 ￿ ‘t) = ￿,
equalization of (5) and (6) gives:




If 1+￿t+1 were higher than ￿(1+rt+1)=(1 + ￿), then the per-client intermediation margin would
be too small to make ￿nance worthwhile (given the maximum capacity of any ￿nancier), hence no
worker would ever choose this occupation and no intermediation would take place; in this situation,
producers would be ready to accept interest rate cuts until the last equality is restored and ￿nance
31becomes a worthwhile activity. If, on the contrary, 1 + ￿t+1 where lower than ￿(1 + rt+1)=(1 + ￿),
then all workers would choose to work in the ￿nancial sector and ￿nanciers would end up with no
client; then, competition amongst ￿nanciers would lead them to increase 1+￿t+1 (i.e., to decrease
their unit margin) until the last equality is restored. Since in the second regime the ￿nancial sector
has size 1 ￿ ‘t = 1=(1 + ￿), the equilibrium size of this sector under capacity constraint is:













which generalizes equation (7). Note that the latter equation de￿nes the minimal value of the
market friction index ￿; below which ￿nanciers are at their maximum capacity:
￿ ￿ =
1 + rt+1
(1 + ￿)(1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿)
:
To summarize: with a maximum capacity constraint the size of the ￿nancial sector, 1 ￿ ‘t,





and linearly increasing in ￿ (with slope 1 ￿ ￿=(1 + rt+1)) for ￿ 2
￿￿ ￿;1
￿
: Were frictional rents
to be removed by an almighty social planner, the optimal size of the ￿nancial sector would be
1 ￿ ‘t = 1=(1 + ￿), and thus decreasing in ￿nanciers￿capacity. Our baseline case is recovered as
￿ ! +1, so that ￿ ￿ = 0 and hence ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8￿ 2 [0;1].
The analysis in the body of the paper exactly applies to this alternative speci￿cation pro-
vided that ￿ > ￿ ￿ (i.e., ￿ and ￿ are jointly su¢ ciently large) at the bubbleless steady state: since
@￿ ￿=@rt+1 < 0 while the bubbly steady state has higher productive rate than the bubbleless steady
state, this would imply that ￿ > ￿ ￿ also at the bubbly steady state, and the capacity constraint
would never bind in the vicinity of either. There is one implication of this speci￿cation that we do
not analyze explicitly in the body of the paper but which may be of interest: the possibility that
the capacity constraint binds in the bubbleless steady state but not in the bubbly steady state. In
this situation, the bubbleless equilibrium is associated with an optimal ￿nancial sector size while
the bubbly equilibrium has too large a ￿nancial sector. In contrast, in our baseline speci￿cation
the ￿nancial sector is too large in both equilibria (although bubbles worsen the problem).
B. Local dynamics of the basic model
B1. Bubbleless equilibrium
We use hatted variables to denote proportional deviations of the corresponding variables from the
steady state (e.g., ^ kt = (kt ￿ k￿)=k￿). Linearizing (8) and (9) around (k￿;l￿) yields:
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We write the linearized dynamics of the model as ^ xt+1 = M^ xt, where ^ xt = [ ^ kt ^ ‘t ]0 and
M =
2
4 ￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ A￿
3
5:











Note that both roots are real, that p1 2 (0;1) and that p2 < ￿1 if and only if A￿ (1 + ￿￿) > 2,
which is inequality (12) in the body of the paper (when (12) is not satis￿ed we have p2 2 (￿1;0)
and hence indeterminacy). The general solution of the linearized system is
^ kt = c1
p1 + ￿￿ + A￿
￿￿ pt
1 + c2 pt
2; ^ ‘t = c1
p2 + ￿￿ + A￿
￿￿ pt
1 + c2 pt
2 (29)
where c1 and c2 are two numbers whose value is determined by the initial value of ^ kt and the
terminal value of ^ ‘t: Since ^ ‘1 = 0 and p2 < ￿1; one has c2 = 0: Then:
c1 =
￿￿^ k0
p1 + ￿￿ + A￿:
Substituting the values of c1 and c2 into (29) yields ^ kt = pt
1^ k0; which gives (14) in the body of
the paper.
B2. Bubbly equilibrium
Let us ￿rst de￿ne ￿b and ￿b as the same elasticities as those in (13) but evaluated at the bubbly
steady state. The linearization of (15) around (kb;‘b;b) gives:

























Note that ￿ > 1 since ￿(k￿=‘￿) = 1 + n; ￿ (:) is decreasing in k=‘ (by assumption) and kb=‘b <
k￿=‘￿ (i.e., the bubble asymptotically crowds out capital per producer). Next, linearizing (9) gives:





























Finally, linearizing (16) yields:
^ bt+1 = ^ bt ￿ ￿b(^ kt+1 ￿ ^ ‘t+1):
From the three linearized di⁄erence equations we can write the bubbly equilibrium in matrix



















The characteristic polynomial of N is:
~ P (p) = ￿p3 +
h




Ab￿￿b ￿ ￿ + Ab + ￿bAb (￿ ￿ 1)
i
p ￿ Ab￿￿b:
We determine the location of the roots of ~ P (p) = 0 by drawing ~ P (p) over (￿1;+1). First,
note that P (0) = ￿Ab￿b￿b < 0; P (￿1) = +1 and P (+1) = ￿1. Moreover, we have that
P (1) = ￿bAb (￿ ￿ 1) > 0, which implies that one of the roots (say ~ p1) lies between 0 and 1, while
another (say ~ p2) lies in (1;+1). The third root, ~ p3, is below ￿1 if and only if:
P (￿1) = 2
￿
1 + ￿b ￿ Ab(1 + ￿￿b
￿
+ ￿bAb (1 ￿ ￿) < 0
When kb is close to k￿, our assumption throughout, ￿ is close to 1 and Ab, ￿b and ￿b are close
to A￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿, respectively. At kb = k￿ the latter inequality becomes:
P (1) = 2(2 ￿ A￿(1 + ￿￿) < 0;
and is thus satis￿ed under condition (12). This implies that there is a neighborhood of k￿ such
that when kb lies in this neighborhood the dynamics of the bubbly system has exactly one stable
root. Then, the dynamics of capital in this neighborhood ^ kt+1 = ~ p1^ kt, which gives (19) in the body
of the paper.
C. Local dynamics of the model with skill heterogeneity
C1. Bubbleless equilibrium
The bubbleless equilibrium is given by equations (22), (24) and (25). De￿ning Rt ￿ 1 + rt and
linearizing (22) around the bubbleless steady states gives:
^ Rt = (￿ ￿ 1){￿^ kt + ￿{￿^ ‘t; with {￿ =
￿￿k￿￿￿1‘￿￿
￿￿k￿￿￿1‘￿￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
2 (0;1]:
34Linearizing (24) gives:
^ ‘t = ￿ ￿ ^ Rt+1; with  ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿R￿
[(1 ￿ ￿)R￿ + ￿￿]((1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿(R￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿R￿)
> 0:
Finally, linearizing (25) gives:
^ kt+1 = ￿^ kt + ￿^ ‘t:
We obtain a two-dimensional system by substituting ^ Rt (￿rst equation) into the linearized




￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1=￿ ￿{￿
3
5:
The characteristic polynomial of Ms is:
Ps (p) = p2 ￿ (1 ￿ 1=￿ ￿{￿)p ￿ ￿=￿ ￿{￿;
so that Ps (+1) = Ps (￿1) = +1, Ps (0) = ￿￿=￿ ￿{￿ < 0 and Ps (1) = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ ￿{￿ > 0:
Hence, Ps (p) = 0 has one root, ps1, that belongs to (0;1). The other one is strictly less than ￿1 if
and only if Ps (￿1) < 0, that is, if and only if:
(1 + ￿)=￿ ￿{￿ > 2:


















This inequality is necessarily satis￿ed since, with the production function (21), the determinacy













while (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿(R￿ ￿ ￿)=￿R￿ > 0. Thus, in the vicinity of the steady state the bubbleless
dynamics has exactly one root inside the unique circle, ps1. This implies that the bubbleless
equilibrium exists and is locally unique.
C2. Bubbly equilibrium
The bubbly equilibrium is given by equations (22), (24), (26) and (27). Linearizing (22) and (24)
around the bubbly steady states gives:






￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
2 (0;1]; and
^ ‘t = ￿ b ^ Rt+1, with  b =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿Rb
[(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + ￿￿]((1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿(Rb ￿ ￿) + ￿Rb)
> 0:
35Second, linearizing equation (26) around (kb;‘b) gives:
^ kt+1 = ￿s￿^ kt + ￿s￿^ ‘t + (1 ￿ ￿s)^ bt;
where ￿s ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(n + ￿)=￿(1 + n) > 1 under inequality (28). Finally, (27) gives:
^ bt+1 = ^ bt + ^ Rt+1
The linearized bubbly system is three-dimensional (since ^ Rt+1 can be eliminated from the
system). One can thus write the bubbly equilibrium under skill heterogeneity in matrix form as





￿s￿ ￿s￿ 1 ￿ ￿s
(1 ￿ ￿)￿s￿=￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿s ￿ 1=￿{b b (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿s)=￿




The characteristic polynomial of Ns is:
~ Ps (p) = ￿p3
s +
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿s ￿
1











 b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿s +
1







Here again, the location of the roots of ~ Ps (p) = 0 can be found by drawing ~ Ps (p) over
(￿1;+1): Note that ~ Ps (￿1) = +1, ~ Ps (+1) = ￿1, while
~ Ps (0) = ￿
￿s￿






 b > 0:
This establishes the location of the ￿rst two roots, ~ ps1 2 (0;1) and ~ ps2 2 (1;+1). The third
root, ~ ps3, is necessarily negative. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for ~ ps3 < ￿1 (so that the
equilibrium is locally unique) is that ~ Ps (￿1) < 0, that is,
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿s ￿
1








￿{b b < 0:
This inequality is true provided that kb is su¢ ciently close to k￿ (or, equivalently, provided that
b is su¢ ciently small). Indeed, as kb approaches k￿, ￿s and  b approach 1 and  ￿, respectively, and
the right hand side of the latter inequality approaches 2￿(1 + ￿)=￿{￿ ￿. We know from the local
dynamics of the bubbleless equilibrium above that 2 ￿ (1 + ￿)=￿{￿ ￿ is negative under condition
(12).
D. Proof of Proposition 3






, while cu (￿) is continuous in ￿ over [0;1]. The ￿rst part of the
36proposition requires us to show that cb
u (1) < c￿
u (1), while cb
u (0) > c￿
u (0) (in case the cb
u (￿)-curve
crosses the c￿
u (￿)-curve more than once, ￿￿
u is the crossing that is closest to ￿ = 1). The ￿rst
inequality holds if and only if wb
u < w￿
u. Using the steady state counter part of (21) and (22) and
rearranging, we can rewrite the steady state wage of unskilled workers, wu; as follows:
wu =
￿


















where (‘;r) = (‘￿;r￿) or
￿
‘b;rb￿
. We have that rb > r￿ (our condition for the bubbly steady state
to exist, assumed throughout), which in turn implies that ‘b < ‘￿ 8￿ 2 [0;1] (see (24)). Hence
wb
u < w￿
u, which implies that cb
u (1) < c￿
u (1).
We now need to show that cb
u (0) > c￿
u (0). When ￿ = 0, ‘ = 1 (see (24) again) and hence
cu (0) = wu (1 + r) =
￿











Computing the derivative @cu (0)=@r, we ￿nd that it is positive whenever (r + ￿)=(1 + r) >
￿=(1 ￿ ￿). This inequality is satis￿ed at r = r￿, while (r + ￿)=(1 + r) is increasing in r; hence
cu (0) is increasing in r over
￿
r￿;rb￿
, which implies that cb
u (0) > c￿
u (0):
Let us turn to second part of the proposition, which bears upon the asymptotic consumption
level of skilled workers in the vicinity of ￿￿
u. From (23) and the fact that the interest rate paid to












(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)‘b; 8￿ 2 [0;1]:
By de￿nition, at ￿ = ￿￿
u we have that c￿
u (￿) = cb
u (￿), and hence cb (￿￿
u) > c￿ (￿￿
u). Since both
cb (￿) and c￿ (￿) are continuous in ￿, cb (￿) > c￿ (￿) provided that ￿ is su¢ ciently close to ￿￿
u.
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